What Is the Anglo German Naval Agreement
The reason for the Agreement with Germany by the British Government was the conviction that it was better to have an agreed border for German rearmament than unlimited armament. However, this reasoning was strongly condemned, notably by Winston Churchill, who said: “Over the next two weeks, talks in London continued on various technical issues, mainly related to how tonnage ratios would be calculated in the different categories of warships.  Ribbentrop was desperate to succeed and therefore accepted almost all of Britain`s demands.  On June 18, 1935, the agreement was signed in London by Ribbentrop and the new British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. The British ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, advised them not to ignore the possibility of reaching an agreement with Hitler. British Admiral Chatfield also believed that the agreement should be seriously considered, regardless of the reaction of the France. While many saw it as a good illustration of Britain`s policy of appeasement, most members of the British Parliament believed the deal would maintain Britain`s reputation as the world`s most dominant naval power. However, many of them neglected the fact that they had to defend their empire, while the German naval fleet only had to protect their home ports. To considerable national (and international) condemnation, Britain struck a deal that allowed Germany a total fleet of up to 35% of the size of the British fleet (including Commonwealth fleets), and an astonishing deal that Germany could be on an equal footing with Britain in the total number of submarines (giving them a submarine fleet equivalent to the largest in the world). Hitler appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop to head the naval delegation on March 27, 1935. Ribbentrop had been Ambassador-Plenipotentiary Extraordinary and head of the NSDAP organization called the Ribbentrop Bureau. German Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath was the first to oppose the deal. However, he changed his mind after deciding that Britain would not accept the tonnage ratio.
The Naval Pact was adopted on 18 September. It was signed in London in June 1935, without the British government consulting France and Italy or later informing them of secret agreements that provided that the Germans could build warships more powerful in certain categories than any of the three Western countries at the time. The French saw this as a betrayal. They saw it as a new appeasement for Hitler, whose appetite grew through concessions. They were also annoyed by the fact that the UK`s agreement had further weakened the peace treaty for private reasons and thus contributed to Germany`s growing overall military power. The French argues that the United Kingdom does not have the legal right to absolve Germany of compliance with the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.  In January 1933, Hitler became German Chancellor. The new German government had inherited a strong negotiating position in Geneva from the previous government of General Kurt von Schleicher.
The German strategy was to make idealistic offers of limited rearmament, in the hope that all these offers would be rejected by the Frenchman, so that Germany could finally proceed with maximum rearmament. The ultranationalism of the Nazi regime had alarmed the French, who placed as little interpretation as possible of German “theoretical equality” in armaments, and thus played a role in German strategy. In October 1933, the Germans again left the conference, declaring that everyone should either disarm at Versailles or allow Germany to rearm beyond Versailles.  Although the Germans never had a serious interest in accepting any of the UK`s various compromise proposals, the German walkout in London was largely blamed, albeit wrongly, on French “intransigence.” The British government remained convinced that in the future, the possibilities for arms control talks with the Germans should not be lost due to “intransigent” French. Subsequent offers by the United Kingdom to organize Germany`s return to the World Conference on Disarmament were sabotaged by the Germans, who presented proposals for appeals to the United Kingdom when they were unacceptable to the Frenchman. On the 17th. In April 1934, the last such attempt ended with French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou rejecting as unacceptable the latest German offer in the so-called “Barthou Note”, which ended French participation in the conference and declared that the France would take care of its own security in any necessary way. At the same time, Admiral Erich Raeder of the Reichsmarine convinced Hitler of the advantages of commanding two more armored ships and informed the Chancellor in 1933 that Germany would be better off in 1948 with a fleet of three aircraft carriers, 18 cruisers, eight armored ships, 48 destroyers and 74 submarines.  Admiral Raeder argued to Hitler that Germany needed maritime parity with the France as a minimum target, while Hitler of April 1933 expressed the desire for a Reichsmarine of 33.3% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy.  Part V of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles severely limited the size and capabilities of the German armed forces.
Germany was not allowed to be submarines, naval airmen and only six obsolete battleships off the Dreadnought; The total naval forces authorized to the Germans were six armored ships with no more than 10,000 tons of displacement, six light cruisers with no more than 6,000 tons of displacement, twelve destroyers with no more than 800 tons of displacement and twelve torpedo boats.  (e) If and as long as other major naval powers retain a single category for cruisers and destroyers, Germany is entitled to have a single category for these two classes of ships, although it would prefer to see these classes in two categories. When the Kriegsmarine began planning a war with Britain in May 1938, the Navy`s chief of operations, Commander Hellmuth Heye, concluded that the best strategy for the Kriegsmarine was a fleet of submarine warcruisers, light cruisers, and armored ships operating in tandem.  He criticized the existing construction priorities dictated by the agreement, as there was no realistic possibility that a German “balanced fleet” could defeat the Royal Navy.  In response, high-ranking German naval officers began advocating a move to a cruiser war fleet that would pursue a strategy of attacking the British merchant navy, but they were rejected by Hitler, who insisted on Germany`s prestige of building a “balanced fleet.” .